What explains Taliban's invite to 6 countries for government ceremony?

What explains Taliban’s invite to 6 countries for government ceremony?

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What explains Taliban

07 Sep 2021: What explains Taliban’s invite to 6 countries for government ceremony?

As the Taliban is getting closer to announce Afghanistan’s new government, the group has invited six countries to attend the government formation ceremony. These countries include China, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, and Qatar. Notably, the move shows the Taliban’s effort to forge new ties with the international community although most nations are adopting a “wait and watch” policy before recognizing the Taliban government.

Details: What do the invitations imply?

The list of countries invited for the ceremony comprises both old friends of the Taliban as well as new allies. It is well known that Pakistan and Qatar have maintained a cordial relationship with the Taliban. However, the move to invite the rest of the countries is seen as a part of the negotiation to bring about a peaceful resolution in Afghanistan.

Pakistan: Pakistan could be first country to recognize Taliban government

Pakistan is one of the three nations that had recognized the Taliban regime in the 1990s. Recently, Pakistani minister Sheikh Rashid said the country has always been the “custodian” of the Taliban. The Taliban, too, has maintained that Pakistan is their “second home.” Thus, it would not be surprising if Pakistan again becomes the first country to recognize the new Taliban government.

Fact: Qatar has maintained ‘cordial’ relationship with Taliban

Separately, although Qatar hadn’t recognized the Taliban regime in the 1990s, it has always maintained a “cordial” relationship with the group. Qatar has also played the role of a mediator by providing the Taliban with a base in Doha for peace talks with the US.

China: Beijing cautious in dealing with Taliban

Meanwhile, China has maintained it wants a “friendly” relationship with the Taliban. However, it is unlikely to take a hasty decision on recognizing the new Taliban government. While it sees Afghanistan as an opportunity to expand its Belt and Road Initiative, security and stability remain a concern. China’s reluctance was evident when its Foreign Ministry said it has no information on the Taliban’s invitation.

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Russia: Russia concerned about security; likely to trade slow

Russia has engaged with the Taliban for long through its various efforts to negotiate peace for war-torn Afghanistan. Moscow’s stand is mostly focused on the US exit as it believes “foreign occupation” of any country should end. However, due to security concerns, it is speculated that Moscow will adopt a “wait and watch” policy before according official status to the Taliban’s regime.

Iran: Iran: Former enemy, new ally

Iran shares a somewhat odd relationship with the Taliban. Iran and the Taliban had shared a bitter relationship due to Shia-Sunni sectarian strife and had even gone to war. Iran’s ties with the Taliban improved only after the US invaded Afghanistan. As Iran faces sanctions from the US, Afghanistan could prove to be an important ally for Iran in terms of trade and connectivity.

Turkey: Turkey eyes opportunity after US exit

Turkey—which was involved in NATO operations in 2001—now sees an opportunity as the US and NATO have left a vacuum. Turkey is also likely to provide logistical support for resuming operations at the Kabul airport. It is looking to gain via trade and allow Turkish goods to flood the Afghan market, even though there are concerns about security, stability, and a refugee crisis.

The news article, What explains Taliban’s invite to 6 countries for government ceremony? appeared first on NewsBytes.

Also see: Kabul: Taliban arrests journalists as protesters chant ‘death to Pakistan’

Taliban says Panjshir resistance chief commander Saleh Mohammed killed

Afghanistan: Taliban likely to announce its new government today

Why Iran Will Welcome the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan

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After the former Taliban capital fell once again to the Taliban on Aug. 12, the man I interviewed was reportedly hanged.

“He has traveled back and forth from Iran for decades. He was previously a commander near Herat” during the Taliban rule over Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, the police chief—who requested anonymity for security purposes—told me in an Aug. 2 interview held in a secluded location for on the outskirts of the city of Kandahar.

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan—“He travels with Iranian bodyguards,” a tribal elder and local police chief alleged about a Taliban commander from his home district of Shah Wali Kot.

After the former Taliban capital fell once again to the Taliban on Aug. 12, the man I interviewed was reportedly hanged.

When the Taliban took Afghanistan’s key Islam Qala border crossing with Iran on July 9, locals reported that Iranian officials on the other side welcomed them. When on Aug. 6 it seemed the capital of Nimroz province in western Afghanistan was about to fall and many of those afraid of the Taliban rushed toward the border to escape, Iranian officials instead reportedly refused entry to most of those fleeing.

A major reason for Iranian support for the Taliban is Iran’s need for the water that flows into the country from across the border.

Iran has a long history of hosting both key al Qaeda members as well as Taliban leaders. As Foreign Policy reported in May 2016, “Taliban chief Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed in Pakistan by an American drone last weekend after leaving Iran, where his family lives. U.S. officials say that Mullah Mansour regularly and freely traveled into and out of Iran.”

Several sources I spoke to on the ground across the country during a monthlong reporting trip between July and August this year said that Iran has played a major role in the conflict.

While I was reporting from Kandahar, multiple security officials told me that Iranian weapons had been found in the hands of killed Taliban fighters in the area.

They added that they had received information on Iranian fighters operating in Nimroz, Herat, and Helmand provinces in western and southwestern Afghanistan near the border with Iran.

Multiple reports in recent years have accused Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of providing weaponry and training for the Taliban. In February 2017, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan told Congress that Iran was supporting the Taliban to undermine the U.S. mission in the country, noting that “Russia, Iran, and al Qaeda are playing significant roles in Afghanistan.”

The governor of the western Afghan province of Farah alleged the same year that training centers had been established inside Iran for the purpose of training would-be Taliban, and Iranian support was blamed for an uptick in violence that year.

In 2016, Foreign Policy published a report quoting two unnamed Western officials as saying that Tehran was “providing Taliban forces along its border with money and small amounts of relatively low-grade weaponry like machine guns, ammunition, and rocket-propelled grenades.”

A major reason for Iranian support for the Taliban is Iran’s need for the water that flows into the country from across the border.

Mike Martin, a former British Army officer fluent in Pashto who has worked extensively in Helmand and written a book on the area titled An Intimate War, told Foreign Policy: “Iran has developed links over many years to multiple militant groups inside Helmand Province, with its allegiance changing depending on who has the upper hand in the province.”

There are compelling economic and strategic reasons for these links. Martin said that “control of Helmand, and particularly upper Helmand, where the Alizai, Noorzai and Ishaqzai tribes reside, means control of a series of dam canals—in fact built by [the U.S. Agency for International Development] in the 1950s-70s—that allow control of the output of the Helmand river, which empties into Iran’s Sistan region where it waters around a million people.”

The support Iran has provided to armed groups inside Afghanistan, Martin said, has “ranged from money to weapons to routes for exfiltrating drugs, and has gone on for at least the last decade, if not twice that—the water from the river Helmand is a vital national interest for the Iranian government.”

Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives have long transited through Iran and operated from its territory.

When reporting from Afghanistan’s Maydan Wardak province in 2012, I photographed a billboard in Pashto offering a $10 million reward for Yasin al-Suri, a native of northeastern Syria who has long used Iran as a base but is known to have traveled extensively in Afghanistan and acted as al Qaeda recruiter.

This January, the U.S. State Department said Suri is still in Iran, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal: “The State Department also revealed that Yasin al-Suri, one of al Qaeda’s top facilitators, and Saif al Adel, one of Ayman al Zawahiri’s deputy emirs, are also still located inside Iran.”

A recent United Nations report said the Taliban remain “closely aligned” with al Qaeda and that the latter group continues to operate in several provinces of the country.

Meanwhile, earlier this year in the same province where I’d photographed the billboard nine years ago—Maydan Wardak—fighters answering to the Shiite Hazara militia commander Alipoor shot down a government helicopter, killing nine security personnel, including two pilots and four special forces members. Afghan security forces say Alipoor is supported by Iran.

Though some find it odd that Shiite Afghans would be supporting the Taliban—given the targeting of minority Shiites when the Taliban were previously in power—there are multiple signs that some have grown closer to the group over the years as a result of Iranian influence.

The former vice president and Hazara leader Mohammad Mohaqiq has, for example, been accused of “lobbying for Iranian interests” and has long been seen as possibly working for closer relations with the Taliban. He took part in talks with the Taliban at a Moscow conference opposed by the Afghan government in 2019.

Before that, in November 2017, he gave a speech at a conference in Tehran in which he praised Iran’s role in Afghanistan and Gen. Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Quds Force who was assassinated by a U.S. drone strike in January 2020.

Iran does not have ideological qualms about supporting violent Sunni extremist groups when that role serves Tehran’s purposes.

Iran does not have ideological qualms about supporting violent Sunni extremist groups as well as other ostensibly nonreligious ones, despite often being seen as the “protector of Shiites” around the world—when that role serves Tehran’s purposes.

Iran has long supported the Sunni organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip, for example, both financially and with weapons.

In Iraq, Iran supports armed groups working closely with the avowedly secular, U.S.-designated terrorist group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the Sinjar mountains. The PKK and its local allies have at times also worked closely with the Syrian government, long a strong ally of Iran.

Shortly before the Taliban took over the Islam Qala border crossing—which had in recent years brought in a significant amount of customs revenue for a government largely reliant on these very revenues alongside international aid for its functioning—in early July, a meeting was held in Tehran between Taliban representatives and the Iranian government.

In a July 31 question-and-answer session with Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid hosted by an Iranian journalist, Mujahid said: “We always wanted to establish relations with Iran, because Iran has an Islamic system, and we want an Islamic system.”

That system is unlikely to offer much solace to regular Afghans. Only one of the dozens of Afghans I spoke to on the ground in several provinces during a month in the country believed that the Taliban would behave any differently in any significant manner from how they behaved during their previous rule, between 1996 and 2001.

Iran seems to believe it will benefit from the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan.

Some said they believed the Taliban would be even more brutal.

Several journalists have been killed by the Taliban in recent years. The award-winning Reuters photojournalist Danish Siddiqui was reportedly killed by the group in the Spin Boldak district of Kandahar province on July 16. His body was then severely mutilated.

On Aug. 6, the head of the government media and information center, Dawa Khan Menapal, was assassinated in Kabul. He had previously worked for years as a journalist and had often helped both Afghan and international journalists with contacts and information. I had met with him two weeks before in his Kabul office to learn information on Kandahar, where part of his family is from. He, too, told me that it was clear that Iran was supporting the Taliban.

Whether this backing is intended to ensure much-needed cross-border water supply, for religious reasons, or simply as a way to get a government seen as a U.S. ally out of the way, Iran seems to believe it will benefit from the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan.

Lebanon’s power problems: serious talk but no easy fixes

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Energy ministers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan met in Amman on Wednesday where they affirmed their willingness to facilitate transfers of gas to energy-strapped Lebanon.

Beirut, Lebanon- Lebanon’s continuing economic crisis has created a fuel shortage, adding extended power cuts to the miseries of Lebanese already dealing with skyrocketing inflation and shortages of other basic goods.

While experts have said a proposal recently put forth by the US ambassador here to revive a transnational gas pipeline running from Egypt to Lebanon could help alleviate the problem, it is far from a long-term solution for the country’s continuing failure to generate sufficient electricity.

“It’s not a new idea. From 2009 to 2010, gas was being pumped through Egypt to Jordan and through Syria to Lebanon,” Diana Kaissy, a board member of the Lebanese Oil and Gas Initiative and an expert on energy governance, told Al Jazeera.

That arrangement, using the Arab Gas Pipeline, ended when Lebanon defaulted on payments and attacks on the pipeline in Egypt disrupted supplies. Studies are also still needed to address what damage Syria’s war may have done to the pipeline.

“Technically speaking, it could be done by the end of this year if there is serious political will,” Kaissy said.

Energy ministers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan met in Amman on Wednesday. The gathering happened on the heels of a meeting between Lebanese and Syrian officials last weekend that marked the highest official meeting between the two countries in years.

The ministers affirmed on Wednesday their willingness to facilitate transfers of gas to Lebanon. Lebanese officials have said the World Bank has offered to provide funding for the gas, but provided no other details.

Buildings are seen at night during a power cut in some areas in Beirut, Lebanon [File: Mohamed Azakir/Reuters]

Lebanon in the past two years has been offered a number of international loans and grants, including from the IMF, on the condition that the country implement reforms with regards to transparency and corruption — something its governing class has not yet done, even as the country sinks deeper into poverty and dysfunction.

A World Bank spokeswoman told Al Jazeera on Tuesday that the Bank was unable at this time to give details of what may have been discussed.

Potential hurdles

However, there are other potential political hurdles. The United States currently sanctions Syria’s energy sector, but Dorothy Shea, the US ambassador to Lebanon, has said those restrictions could be eased.

The US proposal was widely seen in Lebanon as a rebuttal to a plan put forth by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to import fuel from Iran – a proposal that could land Lebanon in violation of US sanctions against energy exports from that country.

Nasrallah has been vocal about the plan for some time. He gave a speech in August announcing when the first ship would leave Iran, shortly before Shea announced the pipeline initiative.

“It would have been possible to do that years ago when Lebanon requested some exemptions from the Caesar Act (US sanctions on Syria), so obviously it’s the Iranian ship that pushed things forward,” Marc Ayoub, an energy researcher at the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute, told Al Jazeera.

“I think it has to do with the US-Iran conflict at its best — they provide tankers, we will provide gas, that’s how the game goes,” Ayoub said.

Others disagreed.

“This is something that has been in the making for several months,” said Jessica Obeid, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute. “The timing of the announcement is weird. But you cannot just bring several countries and decide on something like this overnight, there are logistics that need to be in place, the willingness of countries to sell something to Lebanon while Lebanon is struggling financially.”

Lebanon’s Energy Minister Raymond Ghajar, attends a news conference with Jordan’s Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Hala Zawati, Syria’s Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Bassam Tohme and Egypt’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Tarek El Molla in Amman, Jordan [Alaa Al Sukhni/Reuters]

Whatever the politics, Lebanon’s state-run power plants have been insufficient for decades, and the generating power produced by Egyptian gas would fall far short of plugging the entire hole. The current proposal sees it being sent to a power plant in northern Lebanon and generating about 450 megawatts of power.

“Lebanon needs around 3600 megawatts,” Kaissy said. “We are currently producing 700 megawatts. So it would be substantial.”

Those 700 megawatts translate to about two to three hours of power a day across the country.

“It is a temporary solution, but it will fill a gap since we are going into the end of [government fuel] subsidies without any plausible solution for people,” Ayoub said.

Another issue that could get in the way is that Israel sells gas to Jordan via the same pipeline, requiring a technical change in the pipeline’s flow or possibly the construction of a new pipeline.

“Although Lebanon would be dealing with [and paying] the Egyptian side, Egyptian gas is likely going to be swapped with gas from Leviathan (an Israeli gas field) to allow it to be transported via the AGP. If this is indeed the case, are Lebanese authorities willing to sign off on that?” asked Mona Sukkarieh, a political risk consultant and co-founder of Middle East Strategic Perspectives.

“Already, there is Israeli gas to Jordan through the Arab Gas Pipeline — so are you going to construct a parallel pipe? All of these require technical expertise, and all of these should be discussed,” said Laury Haytayan, an oil and gas expert.

On Tuesday, there were rumours that the end of government fuel subsidies was imminent, a move that would make fuel unaffordable for many Lebanese, but that some hoped would at least address supply problems for consumers. Whatever the case, many Lebanese are adjusting to a harsh new reality — that for years their currency had been overvalued, and that they now need to adapt.

“We have changed — everything has changed between last year and this year. The lifestyle, the dream we had the last 15 years — now, we’re living the reality we should have lived the minute we stepped out of the civil war,” Kaissy said. “We’re really now adjusting to the currency’s true value, and you can’t have a middle-income family having three cars.”

The country’s lack of strong governance also leaves many with little hope of improvement anytime soon.

“As long as there is an economic crisis, we cannot expect solutions,” Ayoub said. “If you have no solutions and no agreement for the macroeconomic policy — I think in around two years we can get back on track if there is someone who is willing to make reforms.”